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Frequent flier programs 




a b s t r a c t 
We analyze brand loyalty advantages of national airlines in 
their domestic countries using geo co ded data from a major 
international frequent flier program. We employ a geographic 
discontinuity design that estimates discontinuities in program 
activity at the national borders of the program’s sponsoring 
airlines in the Schengen area of Europ e. We do cument that 
foreign consumers earn about 60% less miles and are 70% less 
likely to be a program member. Controlling for self-selection, 
we also find suggestive evidence for higher purchase frequency 
and transaction size by domestic members. These results im- 
ply that national airlines enjoy a large loyalty advantage in 
their domestic country, and contribute to an explanation as 
to why international flights by third country carriers are still 
a small share of the market. 







Brand loyalty can be a significant source of competitive advantage, as it implies a
eluctance to switch to competing brands by consumers ( Klemperer, 1995; Chen and∗ Corresponding author. 
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Rosenthal, 1996; Farrell and Klemperer, 2007; Dubé et al., 2010 ). One way in which
firms build brand loyalty is through the use of loyalty programs, such as frequent flier
programs that proliferate in the airline industry. 1 These programs create incentives for 
consumers to concentrate their purchases with a single airline and provide airlines market 
power over their program membership base. 
The literature on frequent flier programs focuses on their role in creating competitive 
advantages for airlines that dominate an airport (see, e.g., Levine, 1987; Banerjee and 
Summers, 1987; Borenstein, 1996; Lederman, 2007; 2008; Escobari, 2011 ). 2 Theoretically, 
dominant airlines offer the b est opp ortunities to earn and redeem rewards, because they
provide the most extensive range of routes. Therefore, local consumers are more likely to
become loyal to that airline (e.g., Borenstein, 1996 ). In two seminal papers, Lederman
(2007, 2008) provides empirical evidence of this effect by showing that frequent flier 
programs have the largest impact on demand and fares on routes from airports at which
airlines (and their partners) have a major presence. 
The above studies establish how frequent flier programs impact airline competition 
and market structure in domestic airline industries. These findings are likely more pro- 
nounced in the international airline industry, where consumers tend to be biased towards 
domestic products and services. 3 This is particularly important because in most coun- 
tries, there is one distinct national airline that has a large share of the international
market. 4 Here, in addition to being attractive in terms of earning and redemption possi-
bilities, consumer loyalty towards their national airline may provide that airline with an 
additional advantage over its foreign competitors. 
In the current paper, we analyze the prevalence of national brand loyalty in interna-
tional aviation markets by estimating discontinuities in frequent flier program activity 
at the national borders of the program’s sponsoring airlines. One of the key features is
the use of geo co ded micro data on program memb ership and transactions in a geographic
discontinuity design that compares program activity by domestic and foreign consumers 
who reside in close proximity to the border. 5 As these consumers belong to practically 
the same geographic region, all unobserved supply and demand characteristics that vary 1 See Mason and Barker (1996) and de Boer and Gudmundsson (2012) for the history of frequent flier 
programs. 
2 We are aware of an extensive literature on the pro- or anti-competitive effects of loyalty programs (see, 
e.g., Caminal and Matutes, 1990; Kim et al., 2001; Caminal and Claici, 2007; Fong and Liu, 2011 ). Moreover, 
some papers examine the moral hazard implications of frequent flier programs more specifically (e.g., Basso 
et al., 2009 ). The current paper considers loyalty program activity as a proxy to study spatial variation in 
brand loyalty and does not take up the debate on the welfare implications of loyalty programs. 
3 Numerous behavioral studies show that consumers exhibit a positive bias towards domestic brands (see, 
e.g., Verlegh and Steenkamp, 1999; Balabanis and Diamantopoulos, 2004; Verlegh, 2007 ). The potential 
importance of consumer preferences for domestic brands is also implied by empirical findings from a number 
of international trade studies in the car industry ( Verboven, 1996; Goldberg and Verboven, 2001; Cosar 
et al., 2016 ). 
4 It is also noteworthy that many airlines stress their national brand image. For example, airline brand 
names often reflect the airline’s nationality (e.g., American Airlines, British Airways, Air France). 
5 The geographic discontinuity design is a special case of a regression discontinuity design ( Lee and 
Lemieux, 2010 ), and has been previously applied, among others, in education economics (see, e.g., Black, 
1999; Bayer et al., 2007; Lalive, 2008 ). See Keele and Titiunik (2015) for an overview of geographic discon- 
tinuity designs. 








































moothly over space (e.g., distance to airports and consequently the availability of airline
ervices) are controlled for and cannot cause a local difference in program activity. 
We employ a dataset provided by an anonymous international frequent flier program
ith multiple Europ ean sp onsoring airlines. Beyond the availability of geo co ded mem-
ership and transaction data, there are several interesting aspects of these data that fit
ell with our research design. First, all sponsoring airlines represent the distinct national
irline brand in their respective domestic countries. Second, the sponsoring airlines are
ctive in the Schengen area/customs union of Europe. The open borders that exist in
his area contribute to the plausibility of the geographic discontinuity design’s key identi-
ying assumption that unobserved supply and demand characteristics vary continuously
hrough the border. Third, the micro level of the data enables us to provide a wider
icture of how loyalty towards the sponsoring airlines changes at their national borders.
p ecifically, we decomp ose the overall program activity, as measured by the demand for
ileage, into an extensive margin , i.e. the probability that consumers become member of
he program, and an intensive margin , i.e. the frequency and size (in mileage) of flight
ctivities by program members. 
Our empirical analysis provides evidence of large brand loyalty advantages for national
irlines in their domestic country. Just outside the national borders of the sponsoring
irlines, semiannual mileage earned within the program drops by 11 miles per capita.
his implies that the demand for mileage is nearly 60% lower among foreign consumers.
n the extensive margin, we find that the program membership rate drops by 0.8% point
t the border, which implies that foreign consumers are about 70% less likely to be a
rogram member. Hence, the dramatic decrease in program activity is to a large extent
riven by a lower number of program members. 
On the intensive margin, discontinuities may either reflect changes in purchase be-
avior or in memb ership comp osition at the border. Ignoring differences in membership
omposition, we find no discontinuity in purchase frequency and a positive discontinuity
f about 400 miles, or 40 per cent, in transaction size. Following the approach of Lee
2009) and Dong (2017) we correct for selection bias by deriving bounds on the intensive
argin discontinuities among the subgroup of ‘always participating’ members (i.e., those
ho are memb er irresp ective of being domestic or foreign). For purchase frequency, the
ower bound indicates that foreign members may purchase up to about 3 flights less semi-
nnually than domestic members, while the upper bound rules out that foreign members
urchase over 0.15 flight more than their domestic counterparts. For transaction size,
he bounds range from 800 miles less to 400 miles more per flight for foreign members.
lthough we cannot statistically rule out that foreign members have a similar (or even
igher) purchase frequency and transaction size, the evidence provided by these bounds,
specially in terms of purchase frequency, is suggestive of foreign members purchasing
ess than domestic members, all else equal. 












These novel findings contribute to the broad empirical literature on airline competi- 
tion. 6 To our knowledge, we are the first to carry out an empirical analysis of consumer
loyalty towards national airlines. One context in which our findings can be illuminating 
is the ongoing market liberalization of international aviation. Despite the freedom to 
operate international routes between third countries as offered by the deregulation of 
Europe’s skies almost 20 years ago, airlines are still predominantly operating routes con- 
nected to their domestic countries. For instance, within the European single market in 
2016, only 15% of the departing flights was operated by third country carriers, of which
the majority were low-cost carrier flights ( OAG, 2017 ). Besides well-known supply-side 
explanations for this phenomenon (e.g., historical airport slot rights, ongoing bilateral 
regulation on extra-EU routes), our paper offers a demand-side perspective: airlines might 
have a hard time competing on foreign grounds where the loyalty of consumers favors
lo cal comp etitors. 
2. Setting and data 
2.1. Spatial setting 
Our primary data is provided by a major international frequent flier program with 
multiple sponsoring airlines. The domestic countries of these sponsoring airlines are part 
of the Schengen area/customs union of Europe and share borders with a set of foreign
countries that, except for one which we will exclude from the analysis, are also part
of the Schengen area/customs union of Europe. Hence, the borders considered in this 
paper are completely open, characterized by free movement of p eople, go o ds, services
and capital. We divide these borders into a total of 30 border regions (as detailed below).
Each border region contains an area that belongs to the domestic country of one of the
program’s sponsoring airlines and an area that belongs to a neighboring foreign country 
that is not domestic to any of the sponsoring airlines. We analyze differences in program
activity between domestic and foreign consumers that live within the same border region 
and in close proximity (on opposite sides) to the border. 
The main analysis focuses on the average effect over all border regions, but it seems
plausible that there is heterogeneity across border regions. For example, at some borders 
consumers on opposite sides use a common language, whereas at others language barriers 
exist. Moreover, most borders have no physical barriers, but there are mountain ranges at
parts of some borders. As a sensitivity analysis, we analyze heterogeneity by considering 
border regions with such specific characteristics separately. 6 The difference in the number of studies between domestic versus international airline industries is note- 
worthy. This is presumably due to data availability reasons. One notable exception is the research on 
international airline alliances, which has received substantial academic attention (see, e.g., Brueckner and 
Whalen, 2000; Park and Zhang, 2000; Brueckner, 2001; 2003; Whalen, 2007; Bilotkach and Hüschelrath, 
2013 ). 






































The confidential data obtained from the frequent flier program comprises an approxi-
ately 7.5% random sample of the program members at the end of the second quarter of
015. For each member, these data provide their age, gender and residential location, as
ell as information on their transactions within the program during the first two quarters
f 2015. The number of flights made and mileage earned are the two main transaction
ariables. Within the program, a flight is defined as a single flight leg. Hence, a one-way
irect trip counts as one flight, a one-way indirect trip counts as two flights, and so
n. Mileage earned is not the actual flight mileage but a positive function of the flight
istance and fare class of each flight (e.g., economy, business), where the flight distance
ives the base level of miles and the fare class determines the accrual percentage. 
To implement our geographic discontinuity design, we gather maps of all municipalities
nd national borders of the domestic and neighboring countries of the sponsoring airlines
 Eurostat, 2017b ). We use the members’ residential location to match each member
o a municipality and derive the number of nonmembers per municipality using the
unicipalities’ population. 
Next, we construct two key municipality-level spatial variables for all consumers (i.e.,
embers and nonmembers) in our dataset. First, we calculate the municipality’s distance
o the border, defined by the Euclidean distance between the municipality’s geographic
idpoint and the nearest point on the border. Second, we match municipalities to border
egions, by dividing all borders into segments of approximately 100km and assigning
ach municipality to one of these segments based on proximity. 7 We also compute the
unicipality-level distance to the nearest hub of the sponsoring airlines and the nearest
a jor airp ort where at least one of the sp onsoring airlines is present, using a map of all
urop ean airp orts ( Eurostat, 2017c ) and airline frequency data ( OAG, 2017 ). 8 Finally, we
ugment the consumer observations with the degree of urbanization of their municipality
 Eurostat, 2017a ), and average income in their NUTS-3 region ( GeoService RUG, 2017 ). 9
The empirical analysis focuses on consumers that live within 75 km of the border,
ence we drop all consumers that live farther away from the border. This results in a
nal dataset comprising 13,241 municipalities including 4,902,715 consumers, of which
2,858 are member and 4,869,857 are nonmember. Table 1 describes the relevant variables
n this final dataset. 
.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. Within 75 km of the border, 61% of the con-
umers are foreign and 39% are domestic. The overall program membership rate is 0.7%.7 We test the robustness of our results to an alternative border region specification in a sensitivity analysis. 
8 Ma jor airp orts are defined as the top-100 Europ ean airp orts by number of departing passengers in 2015. 
9 The degree of urbanization is a classification of municipalities into cities, towns and suburbs, and rural 
reas. 
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Table 1 
Description of variables. 
Variable Description 
Main variables 
Foreign (0, 1) Indicator for whether municipality n is foreign 
Border distance Distance between municipality n and the border 
Border region Border region of municipality n 
Mileage Mileage earned by consumer i in municipality n 
Program membership (0, 1) Indicator for program membership by consumer i in municipality n 
Purchase frequency a Number of flights of consumer i in municipality n 
Transaction size b Average mileage per flight of consumer i in municipality n 
Control variables 
Airport distance Distance between municipality n and nearest ma jor airp ort 
Hub distance Distance between municipality n and nearest hub of sponsoring airlines 
Degree of urbanization Degree of urbanization of municipality n 
Income (000s) Average income (per capita) of municipality n (measured at the NUTS3 
level) 
Age a Age of consumer i in municipality n 
Male (0, 1) a Indicator for whether consumer i in municipality n is female 











Members make 1.6 flights in the semiannual sample p erio d, each worth an average of
about 1050 miles. The mileage earned is more than 4 times higher and program member-
ship rate 7 times more likely on the domestic side of the border. Domestic and foreign
members have an almost identical purchase frequency, while transaction size is consid- 
erably higher among foreign members. Foreign consumers live about 90km further away 
from the closest main hub of the sponsoring airlines, but about 23 km closer to other
ma jor airp orts. With resp ect to the remaining control variables there are no noteworthy
differences. 
3. Empirical setup 
3.1. Decomposition and operationalization of the activity within the frequent flier 
program 
We decompose the activity in the frequent flier program by using the extensive–
intensive margin framework commonly employed in the economic literature. This de- 
composition framework allows us to provide a wider picture of the differences in frequent
flier program activity between domestic and foreign consumers, by breaking down their 
overall level of activity into the likeliho o d that consumers b ecome memb er of the program
(i.e., extensive margin ) and the intensity of their flight activities conditional on program
membership (i.e., intensive margin ). 
Specifically, the overall level of program activity by consumer i in municipality n ,
denoted M in and measured in terms of mileage earned, can be decomposed into an
G. de Jong et al. / International Journal of Industrial Organization 62 (2019) 251–272 257 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics. 
Full sample Domestic consumers Foreign consumers 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Main variables 
Foreign (0, 1) 0.609 0.488 
Border distance 35.220 22.062 31.730 22.282 37.459 21.651 
Mileage 12.117 542.882 23.419 760.925 4.867 335.919 
Program membership (0, 1) 0.007 0.082 0.014 0.117 0.002 0.046 
Purchase frequency a 1.612 4.079 1.612 4.230 1.615 3.365 
Transaction size b 1063.496 1286.661 984.517 1194.214 1387.606 1570.669 
Control variables 
Airport distance 71.466 46.311 85.942 49.380 62.179 41.714 
Hub distance 267.852 192.867 224.811 204.882 295.464 179.622 
Degree of urbanization 1.805 0.736 1.807 0.788 1.804 0.701 
Income (000s) 32.389 10.948 30.536 7.183 33.578 12.662 
Age a 44.673 16.743 44.887 17.126 43.770 14.988 
Male (0, 1) a 0.598 0.490 0.583 0.493 0.658 0.474 


















xtensive margin and an intensive margin: 
M in = E in × I in , (1)
here E in is the extensive margin which is operationalized by program membership,
nd I in is the (total) intensive margin which can itself b e decomp osed into a frequency
ntensive margin and a size intensive margin : 
I in = I f in × I s in , (2)
here I f in is the frequency intensive margin which is operationalized by purchase fre-
uency, and I s n is the size intensive margin which is operationalized by transaction size. 
.2. Geographic discontinuity design 
To quantify the difference in program activity between domestic and foreign con-
umers, we estimate discontinuities at the national b orders of the sp onsoring airlines by
 geographic discontinuity design (e.g., Black, 1999; Bayer et al., 2007; Lalive, 2008; Keele
nd Titiunik, 2015 ). At the heart of our research design is the idea that at the national
orders the composition of residents changes discretely from predominantly domestic
o predominantly foreign. 10 Under the condition that other factors that may impact10 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out that our design is strictly speaking not a ‘sharp’ 
iscontinuity design. That is, the probability of being foreign does not jump from 0 to 1 at the border but 
ikely at a lower rate, due to a (small) fraction of domestic and foreign consumers living across the border. 













program activity are continuous around the border, any discontinuous shift in program 
activity at the border can be attributed to the nationality of residents. 
This approach addresses the fundamental issue that domestic and foreign consumers 
are not randomly distributed over space, and hence a naive comparison of their program
activity yields biased estimates because of differences in local supply and demand charac- 
teristics. For example, the sponsoring airlines typically provide a more extensive range of 
products at their domestic airports (e.g., routes, frequencies) and therefore offer a more 
attractive program for domestic consumers who live closer to these airports ( Lederman, 
2007; 2008 ). Another potential source of bias is spatial variation in regional character-
istics that affect demand for air travel. For example, a major business center may lead
to higher local incomes leading to higher demand for personal travel or generate higher
demand for business travel (e.g., Bel and Fageda, 2008; Brueckner et al., 2013 ). How-
ever, under the key identifying assumption that supply and demand characteristics vary 
continuously over space, and by conditioning on geographic location, our design obtains 
unbiased estimates of the differences in program activity between domestic and foreign 
consumers. 11 
The plausibility of the key identifying assumption hinges on the openness of the bor-
ders that we study, which ensures that consumers that reside on opposite sides of the
same border are part of the same market (e.g., the access time to airports are nearly iden-
tical) and therefore supply characteristics can be expected to be reasonably continuous 
around the border. Moreover, the op en b orders, and related opp ortunities for cross-b order
arbitrage (e.g., in the underlying labor and housing markets), should prevent strong dis- 
continuities in demand characteristics (e.g., income). We provide diagnostic tests of the 
validity of our key identifying assumption by examining spatial variation in some impor- 
tant supply and demand characteristics around the border, and by analyzing the impact 
of including these characteristics as covariates in our models. 
3.3. Addressing selection bias on the intensive margin 
It is important to highlight that the geographic discontinuity design yields an unbiased 
estimate of the discontinuity on the extensive margin, but not in general on the intensive
margin because the domestic consumers that b ecome memb er are not necessarily the
same type of consumers as the foreign consumers that become member. For example, it
is likely that the reservation mileage for program membership differs between domestic 
and foreign consumers, with domestic consumers becoming member of the program at This biases our discontinuity towards zero, because there might be program activity on the border’s foreign 
side from domestic consumers that live abroad (and vice versa). 
11 In other words, by examining differences between consumers locally at the border, we resemble as close 
as possible a randomized experiment, in which the ‘treated’ (foreign) group does not differ on other factors 
determining program activity compared with the ‘control’ (domestic) group. A standard criticism of discon- 
tinuity designs is that individuals may behave strategically around the border. This, however, is unlikely 
to be a problem here, as it is highly implausible that consumers sort themselves in domestic or foreign 
municipalities because they prefer a certain airline brand. 








































ower levels of (expected) mileage with the sponsoring airlines. Hence, the geographic
iscontinuity design does not guarantee that domestic and foreign consumers are compa-
able conditional on program membership ( Lee, 2009; Dong, 2017 ). As purchase frequency
nd transaction size are only observed for members, this causes problems for attributing
 causal interpretation to the intensive margin discontinuities. 
We address this selection bias by estimating lower and upp er b ounds on the intensive
argin discontinuities in the spirit of Lee (2009) and, more recently in the context of
iscontinuity designs, Dong (2017) . We make two assumptions that are commonly used
o construct bounds in other studies (e.g., Lee, 2009; Chen and Flores, 2015; Dong, 2017 )
nd are plausible in our context. First, we assume that foreign consumers are less likely
o become member than domestic consumers (i.e., a monotonic selection assumption).
his implies that all foreign members belong to a subgroup of so-called ‘always partic-
pating’ members, that is, members whose domestic counterparts are also participating
n the program. On the other hand, domestic members belong either to this subgroup,
r to a subgroup of ‘excess’ members, that is, members whose foreign counterparts are
ot participating in the program. Although we cannot observe which of the domestic
emb ers b elong to this second subgroup, it is possible to estimate the proportion of
excess’ members and trim the upper and lower tail of the domestic intensive margin
istributions to yield lower and upper bounds on the discontinuities for the subgroup of
always participating’ members. 
To tighten the bounds, we furthermore assume that the ‘excess’ domestic members
ave a lower purchase frequency and transaction size on average , compared with the
omestic ‘always participating’ members (i.e., a mean dominance assumption). This as-
umption is in line with a lower reservation mileage for program membership on the
omestic side of the border inducing domestic consumers with lower levels of consump-
ion to join the program. Given this assumption, the intensive margin distributions for
always participating’ domestic members have an expectation greater or equal than the
ixture of the intensive margin distributions for ‘always participating’ and ‘excess’ do-
estic members. It follows that the discontinuities obtained using a standard design that
gnores sample selection can be interpreted as the upper bound and one can apply the
rimming procedure to identify the lower bound ( Dong, 2017 ). 
.4. Estimation setup 
In line with the econometric literature (e.g., Hahn et al., 2001; Imbens and Lemieux,
008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010 ), we implement our geographic discontinuity design by
stimating regression discontinuity models, with M in , E in , I f in , and I s in as the outcome
ariables, distance to the border, x n , as the running variable, and the foreign indicator,
 n , as the treatment. We formulate the models for a generic outcome variable, Y in , which
epresents any of the four aforementioned outcome variables. 
The baseline econometric specification that we estimate is as follows: 
Y in = τf n + β1 x n + β2 f n x n + φs + α + εin , with | x n | ≤ h, (3)




















where f n is a binary foreign indicator variable for municipality n ; x n is the distance to the
border of municipality n , which is negative for domestic municipalities and positive for
foreign municipalities, so that we have f n = 1 if x n > 0 and f n = 0 if x n < 0; τ provides
a point estimate of the discontinuity at the border; β1 and β2 represent the linear rela-
tionship between the outcome variable and distance to the b order; φs are b order region
fixed effects capturing border region-invariant characteristics; α is an intercept; and εin 
is a random error term. 12 
We relax the linearity assumption between the outcome variable and distance to the 
border by using a local linear estimation approach. 13 Specifically, we estimate Eq. (3) on
the subset of consumers in municipalities within a certain bandwidth, denoted h , around
the border, using a rectangular kernel. We use a bandwidth of 50 km as a baseline, and
test the robustness of our estimates to different bandwidths by estimating Eq. (3) for a
range of bandwidths. 14 
The specification in Eq. (3) resembles a standard regression discontinuity setup, except 
for the inclusion of the border region fixed effects. These fixed effects do not only improve
efficiency, but are also needed for consistency. The border stretches out over more than
4,000 km, and program activity might vary substantially along the border. For instance, 
in some border regions program activity may be higher because of a nearby business
center or major airport attracting residents with relatively high demand for air travel. 
As not every border region has an equal share of domestic and foreign consumers, this
may imply a correlation between the foreign indicator and the error term. Another way 
to think about these fixed effects is that they ensure that we estimate differences between
domestic and foreign consumers that live close to the same part of the border. 
The border region fixed effects are coded using the weighted effects transformation 
by Sweeney and Ulveling (1972) . This transformation differs from conventional dummy 
transformation by setting the impact of the reference region equal to the weighted neg-
ative sum of the coefficients for the other regions, instead of equal to zero. 15 Although
these two transformations are functionally equivalent, it ensures that the estimated in- 
tercept, α, is equal to the mean of the outcome variable conditional on that both f n and
x n are equal to zero. In other words, α equals the mean of the outcome variable for the
average domestic consumer at the border. For example, in the extensive margin model 
( Y in = E in ), α represents the average program membership rate just at the domestic side12 Additional covariates can be straightforwardly included in this specification. Although their inclusion 
is not needed for consistency, they can be useful to test the validity of the discontinuity design ( Lee and 
Lemieux, 2010 ). For this reason, we do include additional covariates in a sensitivity analysis. 
13 Another approach to relax the linearity assumption is to use polynomial functions of x n ( Lee and Lemieux, 
2010 ). We opt for the local estimation approach, as this generally leads to more robust estimates, better 
coverage of confidence intervals and avoids issues related to choosing the order of the polynomial ( Gelman 
and Imbens, 2017 ). 
14 We are aware of recent studies on statistically optimal bandwidths (see, e.g., Calonico et al., 2014 ). These 
bandwidths are optimal with respect to a specific model, which implies different bandwidths for different 
models (e.g., the optimal bandwidth for extensive margin model is not the same as the ones for the intensive 
margin models). To avoid this confusion, we opt for choosing a baseline bandwidth that is similar across all 
models, and show that our estimates are insensitive to the choice of bandwidth. 
15 See also Nieuwenhuis et al. (2017) for the differences between dummy, effects and weighted effects coding. 





































f the border. This intercept can be used as a ‘domestic counterfactual’ against which
he estimated discontinuity can be compared, allowing us to report an estimate of the
elative size of the discontinuity, denoted ρ, by expressing τ as a share of the domestic
ounterfactual, α, as follows: 
ρ = τ/α. (4)
We now turn to estimating the bounds on the intensive margin discontinuities. Recall
hat we can interpret our point estimate of the discontinuity, τ in Eq. (3) , as the upper
ound, and apply the trimming procedure to estimate the lower bound. Following Lee
2009) and Dong (2017) , our approach amounts to first estimating the fraction of ’excess’
omestic members, next finding the corresponding quantile of the domestic intensive
argin distributions which is used to trim the lower tail of these distributions, and
hen compute the lower bound by re-estimating the discontinuity using the trimmed
istributions. 
Let q be the fraction of ‘excess’ domestic members. This fraction is estimated by
ividing the difference in the domestic and foreign membership rates at the border, by
he domestic membership rate at the border (i.e., the relative discontinuity effect, ρ, on
he extensive margin). Next, we estimate a quantile regression for the q th quantile of the
utcome distribution, as follows: 
Q q ( Y in ) = τ q f n + βq 1 x n + β
q 
2 f n x n + φq s + αq + ε
q 
in , with | x n | ≤ h, (5)
hich is the quantile regression equivalent of Eq. (3) . 16 The parameter αq provides an
stimate of the q th quantile of the intensive margin distributions for domestic consumers
t the border. 
We trim the intensive margin distributions on the domestic side of the border by
ropping all domestic members who have a purchase frequency or transaction size less
han or equal to the estimated quantile, αq . Finally, we re-estimate Eq. (3) using this
rimmed sample to arrive at the lower bound on the discontinuity. 
. Empirical results 
.1. Graphical evidence and diagnostic tests 
We first provide graphical support for the presence of discontinuities in program ac-
ivity at the national borders of the program’s sponsoring airlines by presenting various
lots showing the spatial variation in the outcome variables around the border. Moreover,
e test our key identifying assumption by providing similar plots that show the absence
f discontinuities in demand and supply characteristics around the border. We also pro-
ide evidence of differential selection into program membership at opposite sides of the
order. All plots throughout this section are constructed by regressing the variable in16 For purchase frequency, we use the smoothing procedure described in Machado and Silva (2005) , as it is 
 count variable, so standard quantile regression does not apply. 
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question on the border region fixed effects and a series of distance to the border dummies,
and plotting the estimated coefficients on these distance dummies. The dummy just on 
the domestic side of the border normalized to zero (see Bayer et al., 2007 , for a similar
presentation). 
Fig. 1 shows the plots for the four outcome variables. Three main patterns emerge from
these plots. First, as shown in the top-left panel, there is a clear drop in the overall level
of program activity at the border, while similar discontinuities are not present at non-
b order p oints. Thus, foreign consumers that live just across the border earn a considerably
lower level of mileage in the frequent flier program compared with their direct domestic 
neighbors. Second, as shown in the top-right panel, it appears that the drop in overall
program activity is driven to a considerable extent by the extensive margin. That is, the
overall level of program activity is considerably lower on the foreign side of the border
because less consumers become member of the program. Third, regarding the intensive 
margins, as shown in the lower panels, there is no discontinuity in purchase frequency,
but a discontinuous jump at the border in transaction size. This suggests that although 
foreign consumers are less likely to be program members, those that select themselves 
into membership accrue more mileage by sp ending more p er flight. 
Similar plots for two important supply and two important demand characteristics 
are shown in Fig. 2 . These plots show that all four variables are reasonably continuous
through the border. In particular the spatial variation in distances to airports, as shown in
the top panels, is clearly continuous. At the same time, there are no visible discontinuities
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t the border in terms of income and degree of urbanization although the patterns are
omewhat less smooth. 17 
Finally, Fig. 3 shows the spatial variation in the members’ gender and age. 18 It is
mportant to stress that these two characteristics are only observed for members and,
ence, these plots are conditional on program membership. The plots are indicative of
ifferential selection into program membership at each side of the border. Overall, foreign
embers are more likely to be male and belong to the working population, and less likely
o be retired. This implies that for estimating discontinuities on the intensive margin,
he discussed sample selection corrections are warranted. 
.2. Baseline model estimation results 
Table 3 reports the estimates of the discontinuities at the border. Each row provides
he estimates for a different outcome variable. The first column provides the number of
bservations. Point estimates and corresponding standard errors of the domestic coun-
erfactual, α, and the discontinuity, τ , as obtained from Eq. (3) , are given in the second
nd third columns. Below the discontinuity estimates, we also present the relative dis-
ontinuity effect, ρ, as obtained from Eq. (4) and converted to percentages. The final17 We should also note here that degree of urbanization is a categorical variable with three levels (i.e., 
ities, towns, and rural areas), and therefore strictly one should make separate plots for the density of each 
evel. These plots are presented in Appendix A , and show that there is a small discontinuous drop in the 
umber of cities and a jump in the number of towns at the border. 
18 The age groups are defined according to the standard used by Eurostat. 
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Fig. 3. Relationships between member characteristics and distance to the border. 
Table 3 
Baseline model estimation results. 
Bounds on discontinuity effect 
Domestic Discontinuity Lower Upper 
Outcome variable Obs. counterfactual effect bound bound 95% CI 
Program activity 








Purchase frequency 20,703 1.532 ∗∗ 0.152 −3.223 ∗∗ 0.152 [ −4.968 0.389] 
(0.065) (0.140) (1.061) (0.144) 
9.9% −64.8% a 9.9% 
Transaction size 7,489 1,019.3 ∗∗ 411.6 ∗∗ −821.5 ∗∗ 411.6 ∗∗ [ −1,223.5 555.7] 
(38.0) (85.2) (244.4) (87.6) 
40.4% −35.6% a 40.4% 
Note(s) : Estimation follows Section 3.4 , using a bandwidth of 50 km and a rectangular kernel. Border region 
fixed effects and distance to the border are not reported. a Trimming the domestic distributions also changes 
the domestic counterfactual that is used to compute the relative discontinuity effect, which is 4.971 for 
purchase frequency and 2,308.923 for transaction size. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01. 










































a  hree columns are reserved for the bounds on the intensive margin discontinuities and
he corresponding confidence intervals. As the running variable (distance to the border)
nd treatment (foreign indicator) are on the municipality level, the standard errors have
een clustered at the municipality level. Standard errors on the bounds are obtained by
 o otstrapping, using 1,000 nonparametric b o otstrap samples. The reported confidence
ntervals are of the type discussed in Imbens and Manski (2004) , which provide the
onfidence interval for the true discontinuity instead of for the estimated interval. 
The estimate of the discontinuity in mileage is equal to −11 . 370 , which implies that
oreign consumers at the border earn just over 11 miles less than their direct domestic
eighbors. In light of the domestic counterfactual, which shows that the average mileage
arned just at the domestic side of the border is equal to 19.893, this amounts to a mileage
rop of nearly 60% (57.2%). On the extensive margin, the estimate of the discontinuity
n the program membership equals −0 . 008 . This implies that, at the border, the foreign
embership rate is 0.8 per cent points lower compared with the domestic membership
ate. Given the domestic counterfactual membership rate of 0.011, this implies a decrease
n program membership of almost 70% (68.9%). When not controlling for differences in
emb ership comp osition due to self-selection, the findings on the intensive margin are
s follows. For purchase frequency, the discontinuity is not statistically significant at
onventional significance levels. For transaction size it equals 411.602, implying that
embers just on the foreign side of the border earn approximately 400 miles more per
ight than their domestic counterparts. This discontinuity in transaction size represents
 40% (40.4%) increase over the domestic counterfactual transaction size of 1,015.426
iles per flight. 
The estimated bounds on the intensive margin discontinuities provide an insight into
he differences between ‘always participating’ domestic and foreign members. For pur-
hase frequency, the estimated lower and upper bounds are −3 . 223 and 0 . 152 , respec-
ively, while the bounds for transaction size are −821 . 512 and 411.602. The width of
hese bounds is quite substantial and the corresponding confidence intervals include zero.
ence, we cannot statistically infer whether the ‘always participating’ foreign members
pend more or less than their domestic counterparts. Nevertheless, the bounds are still
nformative on the size of their differences. The upper bound on purchase frequency is
ot statistically significant at conventional significance levels and equals only 0.15 flight.
o, we can rule out that foreign members purchase significantly more flights than domes-
ic members. In contrast, the lower bound of almost 3 flights less for foreign members is
oth statistically and economically significant. These bounds are therefore suggestive of a
igher purchase frequency on the domestic side of the border. The bounds on transaction
ize are less informative, but because the negative region covered by the bounds is still
wice as large as the positive region, it is again more likely that the effect is negative. 
In addition, we like to point out that it is plausible that the ‘excess’ domestic members
re relatively dominant in the lower tail of the intensive margin distributions. Even under
he mean dominance assumption, the upper bounds are based on the rather conservative
ssumption that the average purchase frequency and transaction size of ‘excess’ domestic









































































members is equal to the corresponding averages of the ‘always participating’ domestic 
members. Given that benefits of the program are proportional to the amount of mileage it
is more likely that the ‘excess’ members have a lower purchase frequency and transaction 
size on average. In conclusion, the evidence provided by the b ounds p oints towards the
presence of negative discontinuities on the intensive margin. That is, all else equal, foreign
members likely have a lower purchase frequency and transaction size. 
4.3. Sensitivity analyses 
To verify the robustness of our estimates, we conduct a number of sensitivity analyses. 
The estimates appear robust to a range of bandwidths, alternative specifications, and 
various subsets of the data. 
Fig. 4 illustrates the sensitivity of our estimates to bandwidth selection. For a range
of bandwidths, we show the estimate of the discontinuity in overall program activity 
and extensive margin (top panels) and lower and upper bounds of the discontinuity in
the intensive margins (lower panels) along with the associated 95% interval. All plots 
show robust patterns, indicating that our estimates are rather insensitive to choice of 
19 bandwidth. 
G. de Jong et al. / International Journal of Industrial Organization 62 (2019) 251–272 267 
Table 4 
Sensitivity analyses estimation results (overall program activity and extensive margin). 
Alternative specification Border region subset a 
Covariate- Non- Alt. border International Common Mountain 
adjusted parametric regions services only a language a ranges a 
Program activity 
Mileage −10.063 ∗∗ −13.762 ∗∗ −11.267 ∗∗ −11.123 ∗∗ −15.175 ∗∗ −4.977 
(2.158) (1.258) (2.682) (2.765) (3.914) (8.821) 
−44% −60.6% −60.8% −70.8% −78.7% −53.2% 
Extensive margin 
Program membership −0.007 ∗∗ −0.009 ∗∗ −0.008 ∗∗ −0.008 ∗∗ −0.009 ∗∗ −0.010 ∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
−62.6% −71.3% −72.5% −79.1% −80.3% −77.6% 
Note(s) : Estimation of variations on Eq. (3) , using a bandwidth of 50 km and a rectangular kernel. Border 
region fixed effects and distance to border are not reported. 
a The number of observations in these subsets are 12,109, 10,887 and 7,433, respectively, in both the mileage 


























Tables 4 and 5 report the estimates obtained from various sensitivity analyses. The
rst column in both tables provide the estimates for a specification including covariates. 20
he reported estimates for the discontinuities and the bounds on the intensive margin
re largely similar to the baseline estimates. These results therefore add confidence in
he ability of our geographic discontinuity design to effectively control for unobserved
arket and regional characteristics. 
The second column shows estimates of a nonparametric specification that does not
ontrol for distance to the border. Although the differences between the nonparametric
nd baseline estimates are small, the discontinuity effects increase in magnitude and
he lower and upp er b ounds are now more negative. This is in line with the idea that
he nonparametric specification does not adequately control for the fact that domestic
onsumers are substantially closer to the hubs of the sponsoring airlines which potentially
eads to an overestimate of the true discontinuity effects. 
In the third column, we create alternative border regions based on each distinct border
etween a domestic and a neighboring foreign country and refit the models using these
ew border regions as fixed effects. The estimates reported in the third column are
lmost identical to the baseline estimates, suggesting that they are not sensitive to the
pecification of border regions. 
In column four, we test whether a predisposition of domestic consumers towards do-
estic air travel can explain the discontinuity effects. We exploit the fact that in one of
he domestic countries domestic air travel is practically nonexistent. Reassuringly, the19 For small bandwidths (i.e., < 10 km) the estimates become somewhat unstable, due to the limited number 
f remaining observations. 
20 These covariates are distance to the nearest major airport, distance to the nearest hub of the sponsoring 
irlines, income, degree of urbanization, gender and age. As the latter two variables are only observed for 
embers, they are only included in the intensive margin models. The coefficient estimates of the covariates 





















Sensitivity analyses estimation results (intensive margins). 
Alternative specification Border region subset a 
Covariate- Non- Alt. border International Common Mountain 
adjusted parametric regions services only language ranges 
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Intensive margin 
Purchase frequency −3.212 ∗∗ 0.065 −5.771 ∗∗ 0.052 −5.266 ∗∗ 0.149 −3.934 ∗∗ 0.407 ∗∗ −5.194 ∗ 0.146 −7.140 ∗∗ −0.719 ∗∗
(0.528) (0.115) (1.222) (0.065) (1.099) (0.115) (1.272) (0.134) (2.508) (0.149) (2.508) (0.149) 
−60.1% 4.0% −75.3% 3.1% −75.2% 9.7% −72.0% 38.7% −78.6% 11.2% −83.4% −36.1% 
Transaction size −969.4 ∗∗ 339.4 ∗∗ −946.4 ∗∗ 319.8 ∗∗ −919.7 ∗∗ 414.5 ∗∗ −1,850.8 ∗ 306.8 ∗∗ −1,784.7 411.9 ∗∗ −160.3 607.7 ∗∗
(257.0) (85.8) (176.7) (49.7) (211.2) (83.0) (735.4) (116.8) (1,032.0) (134.7) (957.4) (136.1) 
−35.4% 26.8% −40.7% 32.3% −38.4% 40.5% −53.0% 23.4% −52.1% 33.0% −13.5% 128% 
Note(s) : Estimation of variations on Eq. (3) , using a bandwidth of 50 km and a rectangular kernel. Border region fixed effects and distance to border 
are not reported. 
a The number of observations in these subsets are 11,232, 8,217, and 4,333, respectively, in the purchase frequency models and 3,962, 2,871, and 1,735, 
respectively, in the transaction size models. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01. 








































l  iscontinuity effects remain largely similar when estimating the models on the subset of
order regions of this domestic country. 
In the remaining two columns we estimate the discontinuities for subsets of regions
ith a common language and border regions with mountain ranges. Because of the smaller
amples used, standard errors increase substantially, especially for the intensive margin
stimates. Moreover, it is likely that these regions do not only differ in terms of language
r geographical barriers but also on other (unobserved) characteristics. This might ex-
lain the somewhat surprising finding of seemingly more pronounced discontinuities in
ommon language regions, or the higher transaction sizes on the foreign side of mountain
 orders. Most imp ortantly, however, the findings are qualitatively in line with our main
ndings and suggest that negative discontinuities in program activity persist in border
egions with a common language or mountain ranges. 
. Conclusion 
The importance of brand loyalty for understanding firm competition and market struc-
ure is widely recognized. Brand loyalty is thought to provide firms with a competitive
dvantage and may even deter entry. In global industries, such as the international air-
ine industry, national brands may enjoy substantially higher levels of loyalty in their
omestic country. It is difficult to estimate these loyalty advantages because of the com-
ination of spatial differences in supply and demand characteristics and domestic and
oreign consumers not being randomly distributed over space. 
This paper examines the prevalence of national brand loyalty advantage in the airline
ndustry, using geo co ded micro data on program memb ership and transactions from a
ajor international frequent flier program. These data allow us to address the endogene-
ty problems by estimating discontinuities in frequent flier program activity, in terms of
ileage earned, at the national borders of the program’s sponsoring airlines. Given the
etailed level of the data we are furthermore able to isolate the extensive margin (i.e.,
embership) and intensive margins (i.e., purchase frequency and transaction size) of the
verall program activity. 
We demonstrate that foreign consumers earn about 60% less mileage than domestic
onsumers. This dramatic decrease in program activity is strongly driven by the extensive
argin, with the program membership rate dropping by nearly 70%. Conditional on
rogram membership but not controlling for self-selection, foreign consumers have a
igher purchase frequency and transaction size, but this is likely because the group
f foreign members differs from the group of domestic members. We control for this
election bias, by estimating lower and upper bounds on the intensive margin effects for
 subgroup of members that participate in the program irrespective of being domestic or
oreign. These bounds are suggestive of foreign members, all else equal, having a lower
urchase frequency and transaction size. 
These findings are in line with substantial brand loyalty advantages of national air-
ines in their domestic countries. Given that our research design rules out a number of
270 G. de Jong et al. / International Journal of Industrial Organization 62 (2019) 251–272 




















































alternative explanations, the results are consistent with the idea, well documented in 
the behavioral literature, that consumers are biased towards their own national brand. 
This national brand loyalty advantage seems to persists even after substantial liberaliza- 
tion of international aviation, and conceivably is one of the factors that hampers further
integration of liberalized international airline markets. 
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